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Arabs and Persians beyond the
Geopolitics of the Gulf
Fred HALLIDAY
'If the Iranians had not tried to establish the
Abbassid Government and culture in Baghdad, or
their great thinkers and volunteers had not striven
and even sacrificed their lives in 1920 for the
independence of Iraq, the Iraqis could not now
pride themselves of their past history'. Iranian
Foreign Minister, 1965, quoted in Jasim
Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran (London : Croom Helm,
1984) p. 21.
'What are these Persians shouting about all the
time? We were Shi'ites before they were Shi'ites.
We had a revolution before they had a revolution'.
Author's conversation in the Baghdad suq, April
1980.
A Gulf of Misperceptions
1  The geopolitics of the contemporary Gulf are dominated by a triangular conflict between
the three most powerful states of the region - Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Emerging from
an earlier history of western intervention, and from the process of state building within
Gulf states in the post-1918 period, this conflict has dominated the region for the past
quarter of a century, and shows no sign of abating: no stable resolution of the conflict,
one  in  which  each  state  feels  itself  to  be  at  a  potential  disadvantage,  has  yet  been
achieved. Yet if this instability is evident to all, the causes of it remain less evident. There
is,  at  first  sight,  no insuperable  international  obstacle  to  peace between these  three
states;  there  are  plenty  of  mechanisms  that  could  resolve  those  issues  -  territorial,
economic, political -  that divide them. It is this apparent conundrum that the article
which follows seeks to examine i.e how this apparently factitious conflict came about, and
what its underlying determinants are. The central thesis is that the causes of instability in
the Gulf, of past conflicts and probable future ones, lie much less in a continuous history
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or in the geopolitics itself, in past external intervention or relations between local states,
and more in the contemporary domestic politics of these countries. The story is one of
how in the modern period politics has both created linkages between the two peoples
that hitherto did not exist, and has at the same time constituted new barriers between
them, as well as between the two major Arab states of the Gulf themselves. 
2  In this perspective, the conflict between Gulf states, and between Arabs and Persians, is a
product  not  so  much  of  imperialist  interference,  or  of  long,  millennial  or  atavistic,
historical antagonisms, but of two interrelated, modern, processes, state formation and
the rise of nationalism. This is visible in the nature of the psychological gap that divides
Arabs from Iranians: one of the most enduring features of the strategic situation in the
Persian Gulf  is  the gap,  as much psychological  and cultural,  as economic,  military or
political, between the Arab and Iranian perceptions of the region, a point I would like to
illustrate with an anecdote.  In the spring of  1980,  I  visited the Centre for Arab Gulf
Studies at the University of Basra. The Centre was situated in the university campus, on
the outskirts of Basra, but a few miles from the frontier with Iran. It would have taken
little more than an hour to walk to Iran. Within months, the area was to be convulsed by
the war which was to last for the following eight years. In the course of the discussion
with faculty members I asked whether any of them had ever been to Iran. The answer was
no. I asked to see the Iranian newspapers that they had in their library : some old copies
of the English edition of Kayhan, from the time of the Shah, were produced. I asked if
anyone spoke Persian. A junior colleague was produced: a Palestinian, who was an expert
on Hafez and Sa'adi. This academic centre, closely tied to the party and state structures in
Iraq,  had  no  resources  with  which  to  evaluate,  let  alone  understand,  the  powerful
neighbour lying nearby. 
3  The purpose of this story is not to single out the faculty of the Centre for Arab Gulf
Studies in Basra. It illustrates a broader characteristic of relations between the two
communities, and one that could certainly be replicated on the Iranian side as well. The
Arab world occupies a place in the consciousness and history of modern Iran, but very
much  as  a  symbolic  point  of  reference,  negative  for  Iranian  secular  nationalists,
selectively positive for Islamists. Iraq has been important as the site of the holiest cities of
Shi'ite Islam, Najaf and Karbala, and networks of clerics and traders have grown around
these pilgrimage routes. But in the modern period such connections have, largely, been
without  political  import.  Thus,  while  references  to  Russia  and  Britain,  America  and
Germany would be mandatory, one could write the modern political history of Iran up to
the time of the revolution without mentioning Iraq or the Arab world at all. The same
applies,  grosso modo,  to  Iraq up to  the fall  of  the Hashemite  monarchy1.  Arabs  and
Persians are aware of each other's existence, and of the long history of culture, religion
and politics that has linked them. There is not between them the complete chasm that,
until at least very recently, separated Arabs and Israelis. Yet proximity has not produced,
and is not producing, greater knowledge or understanding. The antagonism, or lack of
shared perception, between the two sides is enduring, and is an important constitutive
element in the unstable strategic situation in the Gulf. 
4  It is certainly easy in such circumstances to fall back as an explanation on 'history': there
is  plenty of  history to invoke,  above all  because the dividing lines have been,  if  not
uninterrupted, then certainly recurrent. From pre-Islamic times one can cite the conflicts
between the  Persians  and their  western  neighbours,  the  Mesopotamians  and Medes:
during the Iran-Iraq war Iraqi propaganda made much of the claim that Khomeini was a
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magus, an ancient Persian king. Iraqi and other Arab nationalist denunciations of Iranian
expansionism al-tawassu' al-irânî, make much of this connection. The conquest of Iran by
the  Arab  armies  and the  victory  of  Qadisiyyah have  often  been invoked by  modern
politicians: if Iranian secular nationalists denounced the Arab conquest and sought to
claim legitimacy from the pre-Islamic times, leading even to the linguistic distortions of
the Pahlavi period, Saddam was quick to invoke Qadisiyyah as a mobilisatory symbol in
his  war  with  the  Islamic  Republic2.  The  subsequent  history  has  its  own  themes,
appropriate  for  defining  difference:  the  Arab  hostility  to  the  Persians,  traditionally
denoted by the contemptuous term 'ajam, is matched by Ferdousi's characterisation of the
Arabs as 'eaters of lizard'3. The re-emergence of distinct Iranian states in the mediaeval
period is associated with a reassertion of a distinct Persian culture, and political interest.
This was to culminate in the establishment of the Safavi dynasty in 1501: in addition to
creating a strong Iranian state, which on several occasions invaded Ottomans Iraq, the
Safavis continued to clash with the Ottomans over the frontier between the two states,
and in particular over the delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab river. A series of treaties did
succeed in defining most of the land boundary between the Safavi and Ottoman empires,
but the issue of the Shatt, and the related issue of the loyalties of groups living across the
frontiers, remained unresolved4. The Safavis also institutionalised what was to be another
central  defining  difference  between Arabs  and Persians,  the  predominance  of  Shi'ite
Islam in Iran. This made formal the religious difference between Arabs and Persians that
had been smouldering since the early years of Islam. In subsequent nationalist rhetoric
the Iranians could be seen as shu'ûbiyyin, defectors from both Arabism and the orthodox
faith5,  while in Khomeini's rhetoric Saddam was associated with Yazid, the Ummayad
tyrant who killed Hussain at Karbala in 680AD6.
5  In this perspective, hostility between Arabs and Iranians has been an enduring feature of
the Gulf for centuries, if not millennia. It is in this way that contemporary nationalists,
and those who see the region in terms of timeless cultural forces, often present current
conflicts.  But  such  an  approach  is  questionable.  History  is  not  univocal:  for  all  the
conflicts and conquests, and insults and divergences, there has been at least as much to
unite and bring together the Arabs and Iranians as there has to divide them. Language,
religion, pilgrimage, migration, trade have tied the regions of both peoples together for
all of history. For much of the time they have lived in peace, not war. Moreover, the very
formulation of the issue in terms of two opposed, conflicting, 'nations' is misleading: the
political boundaries have not corresponded to neat ethnic and linguistic divisions. Within
what  is  today  the  Arab  domains  there  have  always  been  communities  with  Iranian
characteristics; in Iraq, open for centuries to Iranian influence, not least in the period of
the Persian-influenced Abbasid empire, the very culture of the Arab speakers is suffused
with Iranian influence. One only has to listen to spoken Iraqi7, or look at the turquoise
domes of the mosques of Iraqi cities,  to see how strong the Iranian influence is,  not
forgetting the fact that half of the whole population of Iraq are Shi'ites, while another
quarter  are  Kurds  who,  by  language  and culture,  fall  very  much within  the  Iranian
cultural sphere8. On the Iranian side, script, vocabulary and religion are all of Arab origin.
If one ventures into the difficult and often tendentious domain of racial characteristics,
the  situation  is  clear  enough:  the  faces,  physical  characteristics,  body language  in
Baghdad and Basra differ little if at all from those in Tehran and Isfahan. The 'we' and the
'they' are not given by history but are the products of specific, often conscious, political
interventions. 
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6  To answer the question of where this misperception comes from it is not, therefore,
sufficient to invoke 'history': indeed far from history being an explanatory factor, a cause,
it would be better to see this history, or more precisely the contemporary interpretation
of it, as itself a result of other factors. For all that they draw on the past all nationalisms,
and all official ideologies of 'historic' national conflict, are modern products, a result of
the intellectual and economic processes of the past two centuries, and in particular of the
rise of modern forms of communication and of the state9. This applies to the Gulf as to
anywhere else. If we are to ask what it is that has constituted the current divisions within
the Gulf, including the misperceptions, the answer is to be found in the forms of state
produced in the region in the modern period, and in the way which two groups of people,
previously almost completely separated from each other, came to be brought into contact
by  modern political  forces,  in  particular  by  two such forces,  first  external,  imperial
intervention,  and then internal,  the rise of nationalism. Here we have to look at the
formation and interests of states, and at the mechanisms - education, socialisation in the
armed  forces,  writings  of  nationalists,  print  and  electronic  media  -  that  served  to
constitute and diffuse such ideas. The form that relations between Arabs and Iranians
take today has much to do with these two factors, and much less to do with Medes or
Persians, Sunnis or Shi'ites, Ottomans or Safavis. To illustrate this argument, one may
divide the modern history of the Gulf into three periods: 1921-1958; 1958-1979; and 1979
to the present day. 
1921-1958: Compartmentalised State Building 
7  The  emergence  of  the  contemporary  inter-state  system  in  the  Gulf,  and  of  the
antagonisms underlying it, can be seen as a product of the imposition of modern forms of
state formation,  and of  the nationalist  or revolutionary ideologies associated with it,
upon the pre-existing mosaic of peoples, languages and beliefs in this area of West Asia.
The  initial  territorial  divisions  were  a  result  of  imperial  state  formation  from  the
fifteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The boundary between Safavis and Ottomans
was the site of substantial wars in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries but was gradually
stabilised through treaties,  beginning with that of Zuhab (Qasr-i  Shirin)  in 1639,  and
culminating in the Treaty of Erzurum of 1847, while that between the two encroaching
modern  empires,  the  Russian  and  the  British,  was  gradually  drawn  from  the  late
eighteenth century onwards: the Romanovs took Iranian territory in the Transcaucasus,
while the British pushed against Iran's eastern frontier, through India (now Pakistan) and
Afghanistan,  and  from  the  late  nineteenth  century  also  encroached  on  the  Arab
territories lying on the southern side of the Gulf. 
8  World War I was to produce a new strategic situation, and create the structure of inter-
state relations that has continued thereafter. The frontiers of Iran with the Russian, now
Bolshevik, state and with British India remained constant, but the territories formerly
ruled by the Ottomans were divided into a now independent Turkey to the north-east and
the new state of Iraq, formed from three Ottoman vilayet, to the west and south-west. In
the aftermath of the Ottoman collapse, one further change was to occur: in the oases of
central  and  eastern  Arabia,  regions  only  vaguely  influenced  by  either  Ottomans  or
British, a tribal confederacy led by the Saud family,  and proclaiming a revival of the
Wahhabi  sect  first  seen  in  the  eighteenth  century,  seized  large  areas  of  territory
(including two thirds of Kuwait) and established, in 1926, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Thus one year after Reza Khan established a new dynasty in Iran, the Saudi dynasty had
emerged in the Arabian Peninsula. Albeit this probably caused little concern in Tehran at
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the time, it was later to do so, to both Shah and Imam; for the Iraqis, on the other hand,
this rebel regime, which had ousted the Hashemites from the Arabian Peninsula, was to
remain a rival, and at best an uneasy ally, for decades to come.
9 For the following four decades the dominant power in the Gulf was neither Arab nor
Persian, but Britain, in formal control of Iraq and much of the Peninsula's coastline, from
Kuwait to Aden. The strategic situation was, therefore, one in which Britain maintained
its military and administrative dominance : local states, Iran included, conducted their
relations largely with Britain, and other major powers. There was very little contact of
substance between the regional states. Iran and Saudi Arabia formally recognised each
other. At first, however, Iran refused to recognise Iraq, since Baghdad refused to provide
suitable guarantees to Persians living in its territory10. Later Reza Khan was drawn into a
loose,  sympathetic,  relationship  with  Atatürk,  and  with  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  and
formalised in the Saadabad Pact of 1937: but these were secondary, largely ineffectual,
activities.  The real business was in relation with the great powers:  hence,  because of
British control of Iraq, the frontier between Iraq and Iran itself, particularly that along
the Shatt al-Arab, reflected Iraqi interests.
10  Where there was upheaval, nationalist and social, in these states it had little to do with
other regional peoples, and much to do with external, imperial, domination. Thus the
1920 revolt in Iraq, or the mobilisations in Iran between 1941 and 1953, were not to any
significant extent influenced by events elsewhere in the Middle East11. Indeed in accounts
of the politics of these countries there is little or no mention of this regional dimension.
This was most evident in the case of the Mosadeq period in Iran itself: Iran's challenge to
the western states, and to the oil companies, took place in the aftermath of the first war
over Palestine, and coincided with the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Yet there was little
echo in the Arab world of what was happening in Iran, and the Arab upheavals had little
influence on Iran. If there was an interaction, it was a negative one: Iran's nationalisation
of oil, and the embargo on oil exports subsequently imposed by western states, provided
an opportunity to the Arab world to promote its  own interests.  Kuwait  increased its
production to fill the gap left by Iran, while in the British colony of Aden BP constructed a
refinery  to  replace  the  one  lost  at  Abadan.  The  Arab  world's  exploitation  of  Iran's
difficulties confirmed the gap between the two regional blocs, and was to leave some
bitterness in Iran in subsequent years. 
11  Following  the  restoration  of  the  Shah  to  power  in  August  1953,  the  US  began  to
encourage the formation of a regional military bloc, and this led in 1955 to the signing of
the Baghdad Pact, comprising Iran, Iraq and Turkey. While this very much reflected the
continued dominance of external, western, strategic concerns, it also reflected the shared
interests which the monarchs of Iran and Iraq had in facing a rising nationalist tide in the
region: the Shah had already weathered the storm of the Mosadeq years, the Hashemites
in Iraq were increasingly anxious about the challenge from Egypt. On this basis the first
overt  Gulf  alliance was formed.  All  was,  however,  to change in 1958,  when the Iraqi
monarchy was overthrown and Iraq became an unstable revolutionary republic, the site
of  successive  nationalistic  military  regimes  that  were  seen  as  a  challenge  to  Iran's
political system and regional influence. Equally, the Iraqi revolution reopened two other
issues that were to have a permanent destabilising impact on the region - territorial
claims on neighbouring states (Kuwait and Iran's Khuzistan province) and the Kurdish
question.
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12  This picture of an apparently compartmentalised Iran and Arab world in the period up to
1958 requires, however, one important qualification, one that was to have an important
function  in  later  periods.  For  if  external  relations  were  largely  conducted  without
reference to each other, Iran and the Arabs, and particularly Iran and Iraq, sought to
define this new national identity, and territory, in contradistinction to the others.  While
Reza Khan eliminated the autonomous Arab region ruled by Sheikh Khazal in Khuzistan,
the new rulers of Baghdad began to put pressure on the Persian inhabitants of Iraq12. At
the same time, each used perceptions of the other as an important element in a central
component of the new process of state formation, namely education. The post-World War
I  states  in  both  Iran  and  Iraq  sought  to  consolidate  their  hold  on  society  by  the
development of education and by the diffusion of a state ideology of national identity: as
elsewhere,  such an identity  involved both a  recuperation of  the past,  sifted or  even
invented to suit present purposes, and the identification of what distinguished their own
people or 'nation' from others. It was here above all, in the requirements of national state
building, that ideologies of antagonism were formed. On the Iranian side, the Pahlavi
monarchy sought to distinguish Iran from the Arabs, by highlighting the glories of the
pre-Islamic past, by promoting changes in symbolism, vocabulary and personal names,
and by identifying Iran as an 'Aryan' as distinct from a Semitic culture and people. In
both official and unofficial nationalism, the Arab world became identified with what Iran
was not, with what had weakened it in the past13. On the Iraqi side a comparable process
took place, with an educational programme that drew heavily on the writings of the Arab
nationalist Sati' al-Husri. Al-Husri, who worked in Iraq and wrote fictional stories that
focussed on the suspicious influence of Iran on the Arabs, not only played up the unique
national characteristics of the Arabs, but also identified Persia as the great enemy of the
Arab people14.  To ascribe subsequent hostilities between Iran and Iraq simply to such
ideologies  would be  simplistic:  but  the  diffusion  of  such  ideas,  by  states  intent  on
mobilising their populations through nationalist ideology, was a prelude to later inter-
state conflicts.
1958-1979: Arab Nationalism Confronts Imperial Iran
13  If  there was,  therefore,   one event that  served to break the mould of  previous Gulf
politics and lay the foundations for the later decades of instability and rivalry in the Gulf
it  was  the  Iraqi  revolution  of  1958.  This  for  the  first  time  breached  the
compartmentalisation which had separated the domestic politics of the Arab world from
those of Iran, and provoked considerable anxiety within the Iranian regime itself15. In the
first place, the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq marked the beginning of the end
for British influence in the Gulf, coming as it did a year and a half after the Anglo-French
debacle  at  Suez:  decolonisation  was  already  in  the  air,  yet  the  fall  of  the  Baghdad
monarchy, albeit in a country formally independent since 1932, was a serious additional
blow to British influence and prestige. The withdrawals from other comparatively less
important  states  followed:  Kuwait  1961,  South  Yemen  1967,  Bahrain,  Qatar  and  the
Emirates 1971, Oman 1977. In part, the British place - military, political, economic - was
being taken by the USA, which had begun developing its position in the Peninsula in the
1940s and which had taken advantage of the crisis in Iran to displace Britain as the Shah's
major ally. But the USA, while increasing its naval presence and becoming the main arms
supplier to pro-western regional states, was not willing to duplicate the British presence.
The result was that Iran came, increasingly, to present itself as the dominant power in the
Gulf: it developed its navy, and, especially after 1971, insisted that the Gulf be known by
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the name 'Persian Gulf'. During the l970s this assertion of Iran's hegemony was reinforced
by the Shah's desire to make Iran a great economic power, a 'second Japan': this imperial
project was conceived of as a counter-weight to the Arab world as a whole, and Iran
sought to develop its military and economic ties with a bloc of non-Arab states - Turkey,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India - as a counter-weight to the Arabs. 
14  This assertion of Iranian influence in the Gulf was a result, however, of another factor,
namely the improved relations with the USSR. If after the 1953 coup relations between
Tehran and Moscow had been cool, reaching a critical point in 1959, there was thereafter
a significant improvement, such that Iran felt, by the middle 1960s, that it did not face a
major threat to the north. This meant, in effect, that Iran could refocus its forces to face a
possible challenge in the south, from Iraq, and to promote its presence in the Gulf.  On the
Iraqi side, the revolution of 1958 also opened the way for increased confrontation with
Iran: the assertion of Iraqi nationalist aspirations on the one hand, and the involvement
of Iran,  real or imagined, in the now fragmented domestic politics of Iraq,  made the
connection with Iran for the first time a factor in Iraqi politics16. This was all the more so
because onto the regional conflict was now superimposed the conflict of the cold war:
Iraq, allied with the USSR, faced Iran, an ally of the USA. Iran was seen as a potential
supporter both of Kurdish and Shi'ite movements. As a result the tone of Arab nationalist
reference  to  Iran  became  much  more  assertive  and  critical:  Iran  was  accused  of
expansionism, of using Iranian migrants in the Gulf as agents, of infiltrating the Iraqi
educational  system and so  forth.  These  themes  were  particularly  present  in  Ba'thist
ideology, where, under the influence of al-Husri, Iran was presented as the age-old enemy
of the Arabs. 
15 Al-Husri's  impact  on the  Iraqi  education system was made during the  period of  the
monarchy, but it was the Ba'thists, trained in that period and destined to take power
later, who brought his ideas to their full, official and racist, culmination. For the Ba'thists
their pan-Arab ideology was laced with anti-Persian racism, just as their interpretation of
Iraq's international role, and of the character of Iraqi society, rested on the pursuit of
anti-Persian themes. Thus over the decade and a half after coming to power, Baghdad
organised the expulsion of Iraqis of Persian origin, beginning with 40 000 Fayli Kurds, but
totalling up to 200 000 or more, by the early years of the war itself. Such racist policies
were reinforced by ideology: in 1981, a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Dar al-
Hurriya, the government publishing house, issued Three Whom God Should Not Have Created:
Persians, Jews and Flies. The author, Khairallah Tulfah, was the foster-father and father-in-
law of Saddam Hussein17. It was the Ba'thists too who, claiming to be the defenders of
'Arabism' on the eastern frontiers, brought to the fore the chauvinist myth of Persian
migrants  and  communities  in  the  Gulf  being  comparable  to  the  Zionist  settlers  in
Palestine18.
16  The stage was therefore set for the protracted military rivalry between Iran and the Arab
states  that  lasted  for  the  two decades  between the  overthrow of  the  Hashemites  in
Baghdad and the fall of the Pahlavis in Tehran. Following the revolution of 1958, Iran
began to support the Kurds in northern Iraq, a commitment that reached its peak in the
period 1969-1975 when Iran and Iraq fought a controlled, but at times intense, border
war. Iraq, for its part, provided some assistance to Kurdish groups inside Iran, and, from
1965 began to champion the cause of the Arab population of south-west Iran. Much of the
overt  conflict  between  the  two  states  involved  the  question  of  the  frontier:  an
unfavourable settlement imposed by Britain on Iran in 1937 was rejected by Iran in 1969,
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but this border issue was less an issue of substance in itself, a reasonable compromise
being possible at any time, and more a symbol around which inter-state and nationalist
mobilisation could occur. The settlement reached by Iran and Iraq at Algiers in 1975, an
agreement made possible because of Iraq's exhaustion and Soviet withholding of arms
supplies  to  Baghdad,  contained  three  elements:  an  agreement  on  the  disputed  land
frontier, an agreement on the Shatt al-Arab water frontier, and, most importantly, an
agreement on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It was around this third
issue that the conflict had raged since 1958 and which was to occasion the next, and far
bloodier, confrontation after the Iran revolution. 
17  The concentration on conflict with Iraq did not prevent Iran from asserting its position
vis-a-vis other states in the region. Relations with the third powerful state in the Gulf, the
fellow monarch Saudi Arabia, remained correct, but there was suspicion between the two
royal families, not least because of Tehran's closeness to the Hashemites in Baghdad. As
the British withdrew, the USA tried to promote a loose alliance, the 'twin pillar' policy,
involving Iran and Saudi  Arabia in a formal  'Gulf  Pact':  however,  this  never reached
fruition, and the Saudis, lacking a significant military capability, were suspicious of the
Iranians. For its part, Iran continued to press for recognition of the 'Persian' character of
the Gulf, and was to a considerable extent hostile to the constitutional plans made for the
British withdrawal from the smaller Gulf states between 1968 and 1971. Thus Iran at first
opposed the  independence  of  Bahrain,  and only  accepted its  sovereignty  after  a  UN
'consultation' of the islands' population. Less officially, but in unmistakeably terms, it
also insisted that its yielding on Bahrain should be compensated for by the acquisition of
three  small  islands,  the  Tumbs  and  Abu  Musa,  belonging  to  the  Emirates:  when  no
agreement was forthcoming, London acquiesced in the Iranian seizure of the islands in
November 1971, on the eve of the British withdrawal. Iran also took advantage of crises in
other regional states to assert its military influence : thus it sent support to the royalist
forces in North Yemen after 1962, despatched several thousand troops to assist the Sultan
of Oman against the Marxist guerrillas in his southern, Dhofar, province between 1973
and 1975, and provided the Bhutto government in Pakistan with helicopter gunships to
help suppress the guerrillas operating, with some Iraqi support, in Baluchistan in the
early 1970s19.
18  These conflicts over influence, nomenclature and military power opposing Iran to the
Arab states were not, however, the only side of the picture. In another, very significant,
arena, oil, a different pattern emerged, one in which the dividing line conformed not to
the Arab-Iranian distinction, but to demography and economic logic. Iran and the Arab
states had been members of OPEC since its founding in 1960, but from the early l970s
divergences began to emerge, the Iranians forming an alliance with Arab states, including
radical ones, to increase prices. Here Iran and Iraq had a common cause, and one that
pitted them against the Saudis and other Arab Gulf states, even as the latter benefitted
from higher prices. Throughout the ensuing two and a half decades, Iran and Iraq, for all
their  other  differences,  shared a  broadly common position on oil  prices  and quotas:
whatever  else,  their  disagreements  were  not  a  result  of  a  divergence  on  economic
interest. 
19  The conflicts unleashed by the Iraqi revolution of 1958 lasted for nearly twenty years and
produced a linkage between the politics of Iran and the Arab states that had previously
been absent. Yet by 1975 it appeared that these tensions had abated: Iran and Iraq settled
their  disagreements  in  Algiers,  with  Iraq  recognising  the  thalweg or  middle  course
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principle in division of the Shatt al-Arab river, the revolutionary movement in Dhofar
had been defeated,  and the Iranians and Saudis,  albeit  suspicious of  each other,  had
learned to live together. For their part, the Russians and the Americans had, in the spirit
of  negotiation then prevailing,  agreed to reduce their  rivalry in the West  Asian and
Indian Ocean regions. They did not want trouble. All this was, however, to last for only a
rather short time: four years later the politics of the Gulf were to be convulsed by another
upheaval, as sudden and dramatic as that which had convulsed Iraq in 1958, namely the
Iranian revolution of 1978-1979.
1979-1995: Revolutionary Iran, Aggressive Iraq  
20  The fragile understandings of the mid-1970s were overturned by the Iranian revolution,
and  its  impact  on  the  Arab  states  of  the  Gulf.  As  in  the  case  of  all  revolutions,
interpretations tend to diverge as to whether the subsequent worsening of relations was
a  result  of  the  actions,  based  on  various  forms  of  internationalist  appeal,  of  the
revolutionary regime, or whether the prime responsibility lies with the states opposed to
the revolution, who used a supposed 'threat', in this case from Tehran, to pursue their
own political goals, domestically and in the region. The reality, in the case of the Iranian
revolution, as much as in that of other revolutions caught up in such conflicts (France
after 1789, Russia after 1917, China after 1949, Nicaragua after 1979 etc.) is that both
factors operated. No objective reader of the record can doubt that Iranian leaders did
appeal to fellow revolutionaries, and in particular to Shi'ites, beyond their own frontiers,
and that at least some sections of the Iranian state gave active, financial and military,
support  to  such  forces.  No  one  can  doubt  either  that  on  occasion  Iranian  leaders
challenged frontiers: they allowed clashes to develop along the land frontier with Iraq
and some sought to revise the agreement on Bahrain which the Shah had concluded in
197120. At the same time, it is equally evident that Arab regimes, and the Iraqi regime in
particular, responded to the Iranian revolution by seeking to promote their own interests
in the Gulf: in other words, beyond a very real apprehension about the potential impact of
the Iranian revolution on their own people, and above all on the Kurds and the Shi'ites,
the Baghdad regime believed it had an opportunity to wrest dominance of the Gulf from
Iran and to push its territorial and other claims against Iran itself. We shall never know
the full story, but it would seem likely that, in part influenced by the exaggerated reports
of Iranian exiles, in part deluded by their own fantasies and lack of information, the Iraqi
regime believed that by attacking Iran it could lead to the fall of the Khomeini regime
itself21. The result of these multiple forces was the Iraqi attack on Iran in September 1980,
and the ensuing eight year war, the second longest war between states of the twentieth
century22.
21  As with any war, it is too easy to identify one single cause: both sides contributed to the
outbreak  of  hostilities  in  September  1980,  which  was  preceded  by  months  of
recrimination and border clashes, and in each case several factors seem to have operated.
International  factors  were certainly present:  Iran saw an opportunity to promote its
revolutionary  message,  against  Iraqi  and  other  Arab  leaders;  Iraq  believed  it  could
reverse its 1975 acceptance of the thalweg division of the Shatt al-Arab and project its
power in the Gulf. In both states too there were groups who saw the Iranian revolution as
an opportunity to revive their causes and becoming politically active - the Kurds and
Shi'ites in Iraq,  the Kurds and Arabs in Iran.  The old fear which both states had,  of
external support for domestic opposition, had returned. 
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22  However, on their own these causes could hardly have led to war. The decisive factors
were, in each case, internal. On the Iranian side, the revolution, like all such processes,
unleashed a political process in which calls for revolution abroad, and assertions of the
importance which the new regime had in other countries,  were part of the domestic
legitimacy of  the  state  itself.  In  addition,  in  the Iranian as  in  other  revolutions  the
ideology of the revolution led its exponents to deny the very legitimacy, or importance, of
inter-state frontiers: when Khomeini proclaimed 'Islam has no frontiers', he was merely
repeating, in altered form, what revolutionaries of the past two centuries had proclaimed
23. The reason for this was primarily the logic of the ideology itself: if the ideals in the
name of which the old regime had been overthrown and a new regime was being created,
were to be legitimated this could not be done simply by reference to what was occurring
within Iran. If they had any relevance, it had to be an international one. On the Iraqi side,
two very important factors operated: on the one hand, the fear of domestic challenge,
encouraged to a greater or lesser extent officially by Iran, on the other, the temptation to
consolidate domestic legitimacy by an act of international bravado that would mobilise
patriotic sentiment within24. No explanation of the outbreak of the war can omit the role
which these domestic  factors,  products  of  the contrasted priorities  of  the two states
involved, played. 
23  The consequences of the war were three. In the first place, the Iraqi attack, far from
leading to the collapse of the Iranian regime, enabled the Islamic Republic to consolidate
its  hold,  political  and administrative,  on the country.  Within three years  of  the war
having started, and most spectacularly in the confrontation with the Mujahidin-i Khalq in
July 1981, the regime had confronted, and defeated, all the main opposition currents in
the country. At the same time it not only rebuilt the regular army, but developed para-
military institutions, the basij and the pasdaran, that served both internal political as well
as front-line functions. The long-term cost to Iran of the war was enormous, in terms of
destruction and lost opportunities, but the immediate result was to give the regime a
patriotic legitimacy it had sorely lacked, not least because of the sense, widespread in
1978 and 1979, that Khomeini was too influenced by the Arabs. Within a short time, Iran
had reconstructed a viable, if disorganised, army and air force; in the longer run the war
led to the mobilisation of large numbers of young people into military and para-military
units25.  At  the  level  of  ideology,  the  regime  also  adjusted  its  message  to  introduce
patriotic, as well as strictly Islamic, elements into its appeal: Khomeini, in the initial days
of the revolution had spoken only of the 'people of Islam', now began to talk of Iran and
of the need to defend this particular country (mihan). 
24  Secondly, the Iraqi attack on Iran led to a realignment of the other Arab Gulf states. To
say that they simply supported Iraq would be mistaken. They continued to fear Iraq, and,
in varying measures, maintained relations with Iran: while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were
closest  to  Iraq,  and  provided  substantial  financial  support  to Baghdad,  estimated  at
around $30 billions by the end of the war, some lower Gulf states, notably Dubai and
Oman, maintained commercial and diplomatic links to Tehran. One of the most striking
indices of this dual concern, directed both at Baghdad and Tehran, was the founding of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. For years prior to the Iranian revolution, there had been
calls, most notably from the USA and Iran, for the establishment of a Gulf alliance, or
pact: the reason it was not set up was that the Arabs, and particularly Saudi Arabia, feared
Iranian dominance. At the same time, the Arab monarchies feared Iraq, just as, to a lesser
extent, they feared Yemen. Rich monarchies, with small populations, feared larger states,
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not least Arab republics, with large populations and comparatively less oil resources. It is
this dual concern which explains the timing of the establishment of the GCC: March 1981.
It was only possible to establish this union of Arab monarchs once both Iran and Iraq
were  otherwise  distracted:  the  main  function  of  the  GCC was  not,  as  it  might  have
appeared  at  the  time,  to  control  Iranian  influence,  but  rather  to  protect  the  Arab
monarchies  from the  influence  of  Iraq.  Its  correct  title   might  have  been  the  'Keep
Saddam Hussein Out of the Gulf Council'. 
25  The timing of the founding of the GCC is important, however, because it occurred at a
time  when Iraq  was  in  a  stronger  military  situation and  appeared  to  be  capable  of
winning victory over Iran: the other Gulf states understood very well what this could
mean for them. They provided aid to Iraq, but at the same time feared its triumph. When,
from the middle of 1982, the tide of war swung against Iraq, and when it appeared that
Iran might win, their problem was to a large extent resolved: they could now support Iraq
without fearing negative consequences for themselves. In 1984 this alignment with Iraq
went a stage further when Iraq,  seeking to internationalise the war,  began attacking
Iranian shipping: since, because of the Iranian blockade of Iraqi ports, there was no Iraqi
shipping for Iran to retaliate against,  Iran began attacking the ships of Iraq's closest
allies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 'tanker war', in which the USA and other navies were
eventually drawn on Iraq's side, had begun. 
26  The third consequence of the war was a gradual alienation of Iran from the populations
of the Arab Gulf states. This is not an issue about which it is easy to be precise: there is a
need  to  be  sceptical  about  claims  either  that  there  was  great  sympathy  for  Iran
immediately after Khomeini's advent to power,  or that subsequent events completely
alienated Arab popular opinion. The reality is that, given the undemocratic nature of
these states, no-one can be sure, and in any case sentiment on such issues was probably
confused.  The Iranians  hoped that  the  oppressed masses,  the  mustazafin,  of  the  Gulf
would,  as elsewhere support the Iranian revolution. They must also have hoped that
where there was a Shi'ite population this would play a leading role in opposing existing
governments. There was considerable validity to this latter point of view: in Iraq, support
for  the  underground  al-da'wa  al-islamiyya rose  in  1979  and  1980,  and  the  low-level
guerrilla  war  being  waged  in  Iraqi  cities  must  have  been  a  contributing  factor  to
Saddam's decision to go to war with Iran; in Bahrain, an underground Shi'ite organisation
came quite near to staging an uprising in 1981; in Kuwait, an urban guerilla bombing
campaign by non-Kuwaitis, with some support from Shi'ites in Kuwait, was waged from
1983 to 198526. However, not only did these movements not succeed, but there is also
considerable evidence that even among Shi'ites support for the Iranian revolution was
qualified.  In  Kuwait  the  majority  of  the  Shi'ites,  a  community  comprising  around  a
quarter of the population, remained supportive of the state. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites, while
sympathetic to Iran, continued to work within a Bahraini political framework, calling for
the restoration of the constitution abrogated in 1975. Above all, in Iraq the mass of the
Shi'ite population, while resenting Saddam, remained supportive, and did not seek to rise
in response to Iranian appeals. It would be too simple to say that the Iranian revolution
was perceived simply as a Shi'ite revolution, or as yet another chapter in the history of
Iranian expansionism. But some suspicion of Tehran, and some support for an Arab or
Iraqi patriotism, seem to have been evident27. The result of the war was, therefore, that
far from creating more links or solidarity between Arabs and Persians it compounded
those divisions which earlier state policies and nationalist movements had created.
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27  The end of the Gulf war led to some improvement in relations between Iran and the GCC
countries, yet suspicions on both sides remained. Tensions continued for some time over
the  Iranian participation in  the  hajj,  the  Saudi  organisers  believing  that  the  Iranian
pilgrims were using their visit to Mecca and Medina for political purposes. Relations with
the Emirates remained difficult because of the unresolved issue of the Tumbs and Abu
Musa: Iranian moves to reinforce their position on these islands led to protests from Arab
countries. Above all, however, the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in August 1988 did not
lead to a new period of stability in the Gulf, but rather, after a year and a half of apparent
calm,  to  a  new  crisis,  this  time  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait,  culminating  in  the  Iraqi
occupation of the state in August 1990. 
28  There is as little agreement on the causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as there
is of its invasion of Iran in 198028. One contrast is obvious enough: if in the case of Iran in
1980 it  could at least be argued that the Iranian revolution presented a political  and
military threat to the Iraqi regime, this was not so in 1990. Iraq's attack on Kuwait can,
however, be seen as following a comparable logic to its earlier assault on Iran. There were
international causes, in particular Iraq's sense, shared in this instance by Iran, that its
economic strength was being undermined by lower oil prices,  a trend encouraged by
Kuwaiti and Abu Dhabi exports above their OPEC quotas. The fear that the GCC states
were overproducing to keep both Iran and Iraq weak was evident in both Baghdad and
Tehran. At the same time, Iraq may have felt that there was a political vacuum in the
Middle East caused by the lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli context, which Iraq could
fill  by a  dynamic move.  But  as  in 1980 the domestic factors  were important,  and in
particular  the  link  between  the  impasse  vis-a-vis  Tehran  and  domestic  sentiment:
Saddam had fought the eight year war with Iran, and had survived, but he had little to
show for  it.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Iraqis  had died,  tens  of  thousands  were held
prisoner  by  the  Iranians,  the  national  debt  had risen  to  an  estimated  $80  billions29.
Immediately after the ceasefire he may have felt that he could impose an unfavourable
peace on Iran and he seems to have wanted to wait to see how Tehran would react. But
events following the death of Khomeini, in June 1989, followed by mass outpourings of
grief  and  support  for  the  regime,  and  by  the  rapid  reorganisation  of  the  Iranian
government, may have convinced him that he would not wring more concessions from
Iran. It can be argued that the attack on Kuwait had less to do with conflict with the Arab
world, and more to do with the inability of Saddam to force the Islamic Republic to its
knees. In these circumstances, he appears to have felt that, failing any breakthrough on
the east, Iraq should try instead to attack Kuwait, as a compensation. The domestic cost of
inaction was too high; the prospects of international benefit were too great. 
29  The events following this Iraqi invasion of Kuwait do not need detailed repetition here:
suffice it to say that despite its hostility to any external intervention in the Gulf region,
Iran did not oppose the US-led coalition in its war with Iraq30.  Yet the war,  while it
reversed the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, and reduced Iraq's power, did not resolve the
most important issues in the Gulf itself that had led to the crisis in the first place. As far
as the international issues were concerned, there was no progress : Iraq continued to
dispute the frontier with Kuwait, especially after it was redrawn in Kuwait's favour by the
UN; there was no progress on the issue of 'unitization',  concerning oil  fields that lay
beneath their common frontier; the issue of oil prices remained beyond any diplomatic or
negotiating process, with Iraq remaining under a complete embargo; beyond the specific
limits  imposed  on  Iraq's  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  there  was  no  discussion  of
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multilateral  arms control  measures for the Gulf  states as a whole,  and an arms race
continued apace31.  Most importantly, the underlying political causes of both wars, the
character of  the political  regimes in Iran and Iraq and,  by extension,  in other states
remained fundamentally unchanged. If anything, the situation got worse: while in Kuwait
there was some political improvement, associated with the parliamentary elections of
October 1992, the Saudi elite remained anxious about nationalist and religious discontent,
and its constitutional reforms had little effect; in Iran, the regime, buffeted by economic
and social pressures, and facing continued difficulties abroad, was more beleaguered than
at any time since the crisis of 1981. The difficulties of regional accommodation, and the
temptations of external confrontation, therefore remained. 
30  To a considerable extent, the drama of 1990-1991 was therefore followed by a return to
the uneasy status quo ante, with the difference that Iraq was, for some time at least,
reduced in power.  Iran's acceptance of the GCC and US response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait did not lead to any marked improvement in relations with Saudi Arabia, or in
relations with Iraq: on the contrary, at least two issues emerged following the Kuwait war
to  make  relations  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  other  states  more  difficult.  One  was  the
continued conflict between Iran and the west, and in particular the USA, now exacerbated
by the increased direct US presence in the Gulf, following the Kuwait war. Any prospects
of improved Tehran-Washington relations that had existed in the immediate aftermath of
the Kuwait war were soon dissipated: by the early months of the Clinton administration,
Iran and the USA were once again on collision course, and Washington evolved a policy of
'dual containment' towards both Iran and Iraq. As with the policy of 'containment' vis-à-
vis  the USSR,  the explicit  goal  of  preventing external  expansion by these states  was
accompanied by an implicit goal, that of weakening them within.  Although it was not
able to get complete western and Japanese support for this policy, Washington was able
to put significant economic pressure on Iran. For their part, and despite some differences
between them on dealing with Iran, the GCC states rejected Tehran's insistence that the
security problems of the Gulf  should be solved without external  involvement,  and in
particular  without  the involvement of  the USA.  For  Saudi  Arabia and Kuwait,  whose
whole  security  policy  rested  upon  a  US  guarantee,  this  was  unacceptable.  The  USA
justified its containment of Iran by reference to four issues: Iran's opposition to the Arab-
Israeli peace process, Iranian support for 'terrorism', including its call for the killing of
Salman Rushdie, its alleged plans for nuclear weapons, and its domestic, human rights,
record.  As  in  the case  of  the earlier  policy  of  'containment'  towards  the USSR,  first
enunciated in the 1940s, the apparent goal of the policy, to contain the expansion of the
revolutionary  state  concealed  another  goal,  that  of  undermining it  altogether,  by
depriving it of its international ideological legitimation, the spread of revolution32. 
31  The other issue that divided Iran from the GCC, less obviously spelt out but present in the
minds of Gulf rulers, was the fear that if there were a crisis in Iraq, and if the regime was
foundering under international or domestic pressure, the Iranians would take advantage
of it and install their own supporters in Baghdad. Iran had failed to promote an uprising
in Iraq during the eight year war, and had been indecisive in the opportunity opened up
by the Iraqi uprising of March 1991: but Iran obviously retained a long-term interest in
the political future of Iraq and could be expected to take advantage of any new crisis to
promote its interests, through both its Kurdish and Shi'ite associates. For the Saudis, and
probably for the others, a weakened Ba'thist regime, even with Saddam in charge, was
thought preferable to the creation of a pro-Iranian Islamic Republic of Iraq33.
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Gulf Geopolitics in the 1990s: the Issues 
32  From the perspective of the mid-1990s the Gulf would appear to be one of the potentially
most  unstable  regions  of  the  world,  given  the  combination  of  economic  resources,
militarized tension, and internal political instability. Yet beyond this evident instability it
is worth examining in what the difficulties consist. As far as international questions are
concerned, one can identify at least six areas of tension: territory, ethnic and religious
minorities,  oil,  arms races,  conflicts in foreign policy orientation, and interference in
each other's internal affairs. Yet the sheer accumulation of these issues need not lead to
alarmist conclusions.  The territorial  issues,  if  properly addressed,  can be resolved by
compromise, be they the Shatt al-Arab or the Tumbs and Abu Musa: by the standards of
other border disputes, these are relatively minor affairs. The question of minorities is
again something that can, when not enflamed by external factors, be resolved. Iraq has no
formal claim on Khuzistan, while Iran accepts the sovereignty of the Gulf states in which
Iranian minorities live. These communities only become a major, international, problem,
when states for other reasons chose to make them so. As far as oil is concerned, there are
differences of opinion, and interest, but, as in the l970s,  these correspond not to any
Iranian-Arab division, but to the division that underlay the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1990,
namely that between oil-producing states with larger and small populations, and between
states which are disputing a restricted world market. It is commercial and demographic
factors,  not religion or history,  that explain this issue,  which is one that can also be
resolved by multilateral negotiation: for this, OPEC remains the obvious forum. The issue
of the arms race is, equally, one that should, under suitable political conditions, be open
to resolution: for all that arms races are seen as having an autonomy of their own, beyond
political rationale or control, that in the Gulf is born of the evident political suspicions of
the three major states of each other and of the sense that each may be tempted, for
reasons of political calculation, to engage in further military adventures in the future.
The same applies, a fortiori, to the two final issues mentioned above, non-interference and
foreign policy coordination: the former is a pure function of political will, of calculation
by regimes of where their state and national interest lies; the latter is something which
could easily be resolved, through a combination of tolerated diversity, as on the Arab-
Israeli question, and broad consultation. 
33  It is not the issues themselves that pose the greatest problems, but rather the insecurity
of the three major regimes vis-a-vis their own peoples and their fears as to what others
will seek to exploit.  In such circumstances relations between Iran and the Arabs, and the
ideologies  of  rivalry  and  suspicion  which  Gulf  states  generate,  reflect  the  political
character of these states themselves.  What we see in the 1990s is what has been the
pattern since the collision of Arab nationalism with Iranian state interests first emerged
in 1958: the upheavals in both Arab states and in Iran have produced a situation in which
the politics of all countries are now interconnected but this interconnection has been
accompanied by the intervention of states whose ideologies stress the differences, and
reinforce the psychological gaps, between Iranians and Arabs. The rise of the modern
state, and of forms of radical nationalism and revolutionary ideology associated with it,
has, therefore, in addition to dividing Iraq from the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, served
to drive a deeper wedge than ever before between the Arab world and Iran ends.
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1.. For example, in Ervand Abrahamian's classic study, Iran Between Two Revolutions
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) there is no mention of Iraq. Equally, in
Hanna Batatu's study of the Iraqi revolution of 1958, The Old Social Classes and the
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) there is
virtually no mention of Iran. These silences are an accurate reflection of how events were
perceived at the time discussed. 
2.. Samir al-Khalil, The Monument. Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1991); Amatzia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the formation of Ba'thist Iraq,
1968-89 (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
3.. 'By drinking the milk of camels, and eating lizards, the Arabs have reached such a
state that they aspire to capture the crown of Persia'. The derogatory Iranian expression
for Peninsula Arabs, mushkhor, 'mouse-eaters', is in similar vein. 
4.. On this historical background see Jasim Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran. The Years of Crisis
(London: Croom Helm, 1984); Keith McLachlan, The boundaries of Iran (London:  University
College London Press, 1994). 
5.. For a perceptive discussion of the usages, and suppressed racist connotations, of 
shu'ûbiyya see Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear (London: Hutchinson/Radius, 1989) pp.
216-220.
6.. Saddam was also another one of the 'idols' which the Imam, officially titled bot-shekan,
or 'idol-smasher', was to smash, following the others he had destroyed - the Shah, Carter
and Bani Sadr. Unfortunately, Saddam did not oblige. 
7.. Among many examples, hich, 'nothing', chare 'remedy', and the half-Persian half-
Arabic khoshwalad, 'good guy'. 
8.. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.25.
But Shi'is only came to comprise the majority in Iraq in the nineteenth century. The
Kurds also qualify for inclusion in the Persian sphere of cultural influence by the fact that
they celebrate the Persian New Year, nuruz, the Zoroastrian festival. 
9.. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford:Basil Blackwell 1983); Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
10. For background, see Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq, pp.100-105.
11. The Iraqi revolt of 1920, in which Shi'i clergy played a leading role, was to some
degree encouraged by hostility to British plans for Iran:  but it was the shared enemy,
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12. There were an estimated 80 000 Persians in Iraq in 1919. 75% of the population of
Karbala were reckoned to be Persians (Nakash, pp.100-101).
13. This anti-Arab orientation was no means confined to the official ideologists of the
state. From the early nineteenth century onwards Iranian writers identified the source of
their country's backwardness in the influence of the Arabs, and Islam, on their country.
Ahmad Kasravi, a twentieth century theorist of secular nationalism, sought to locate the
backwardness of Iran in the influence upon the Persian peoples of Arab and other, such as
Turkish, cultures (Evrand Abrahamian, 'Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran', 
Middle East Studies, Vol.9, October 1973).
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14. Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear pp. 152-160. Al-Husri also argued against the
possibilities of Muslim unity, counterposing to a more desirable, and attainable, Arab
unity. In Sylvia Haim ed., Arab Nationalism. An Anthology (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1964) pp. 147-154.
15. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (London: University of
California Press, 1974), chapter IV, 'Iran-Iraq Relations'. Graphic illustration of how much
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21. 'Never Invade a Revolution' ran the editorial in The Times soon after the outbreak of
hostilities. For analysis see references in note 19 and al-Khalil, Republic of Fear,
'Conclusion'.
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Japanese war of 1937-1945. Among general accounts see Shahram Chubin and Charles
Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988); John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The
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RÉSUMÉS
The  formation  of  states,  the  definition  of  their  interests  and  the  mechanisms   education,
socialization in the armed forces, nationalists' writings, print and electronic media  that served
to create and spreand national ideas must be examined if one is to understand the form that the
relations between Arabs and Iranians is currently taking. Indeed these relations owe much to
these two factors  state- and nation-building- and much less to the Medes or Persians, Sunnis or
Shi'ites, Ottomans or Safavis. To illustrate this point, one may divide the modern history of the
Gulf into three periods : 1921-1958 ; 1958-1979 ; and 1979 to the present day. 
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